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INTRODUCTION 
 
Questioning  the  effectiveness  of  EU  competition  policy  and  law 
makes sense because, since the Peugeot case1 in October 2005, no further 
vertical agreement case has been found by the Commission to have infringed 
Art. 101(1) TFEU.2 Although this fact might reveal that undertakings have 
been convinced to behave legally, it also might rely on the changes which EU 
competition policy and case law have adopted in recent years, such as the 
effects-based approach to deal with vertical agreements or the introduction of 
block exemptions in 19993 by the Commission. Most vertical agreements fall 
outside Art. 101(1) TFEU because they are exempted or c an be otherwise 
justified for economic and pro-competitive reasons.4  
Besides Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, the scope of EU competition law has 
been  highly  defined  by  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  case  law, 
Commission  documents  and  regulations.  Namely,  the  Comm ission´s 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints from 20105 (new Guidelines), the Block 
Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010 6 (BER) and Guidelines on the 
application of Art. 81(3) 7  which consolidate European policy regarding 
vertical agreements. The following  section, B, will concentrate on typical 
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vertical  agreements,  discussing  their  justifiability  as  well  as  the 
accompanying case law. In section C, a conclusion will be drawn based on 
the analysis given.  
 
 
I. TYPICAL VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND COMPETITION LAW 
 
The Commission finds in its new Guidelines that 'vertical restraints 
may have positive effects by, in particular, promoting non-price competition 
and  improved  quality  of  services'.8  However, it also notes that vertical 
restraints may result in the anti-competitive foreclosure of other suppliers and 
buyers, softening of competition and facilitation of collusion as well as the 
creation of obstacles to market integration.9 Some types of restraint will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
A. Anti-competitive vertical restraints by object 
 
a) Absolute territorial protection and export bans 
In Consten and Grundig in 1966, the ECJ held that agreement clauses 
which try to isolate national markets and to impede intra-brand competition 
or parallel trade restrict competition by object are illegal.10 The Commission 
followed this strict line; for example, in 1998 it imposed a €102 million fine 
(reduced to €90 million on appeal) on Volkswagen in respect of its contractual 
practices  to  prevent  distributors  from  selling  outside  their  distribution 
territories.11  Monti discussed this approach in 2002 and underpinned the 
Advocate  General’s  economic  argument  in  Consten  and  Grundig12  that 
without territorial protection, no reasonable distributor would take the risk of 
investing in a new and uncertain market if he knew that a free rider, who does 
not share the introduction costs of the product, would later enter the market 
and sell the product, taking advantage of the distributor’s marketing efforts.13 
In its new Guidelines, the Commission holds that ‘it may be necessary 
to provide territorial protection for the distributor so that he can recoup … 
[his] investments by temporarily charging a higher price. Distributors based 
in other markets should then be restrained for a limited period from selling in 
the new market.’14 The new policy is not therefore a formalistic approach, 
unlike in the past, but an effects-based one, which allows legal and economic 
justifications. 
 
b) Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) 
Before moving on to the effects-based policy, RPM, being a hardcore 
restriction on competition, was taken very seriously by the Commission and 
                                            
8 Commission (n 5) para 106. 
9 Commission (n 5) para 100. 
10 Joined Cases C-56 and 58/64, Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission [1966] ECR 299 (343). 
11 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, ‘EU Competition Law’ (Text, Cases, and Materials, 4th 
edn, OUP 2011) 656.  
12 Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission (n 10). 
13 Giorgio Monti, ‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’ [2002] CML Rev 1057 (1065). 
14 Commission (n 5) para 107. 2013]  EFFECTIVENESS OF EU LAW AND POLICY ON 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AT PROTECTING 
COMPETITION 
121 
 
 
led to the imposition of significant fines.15 The new Guidelines, however, 
recognise three situations in which RPM could cause efficiencies to the  
benefit of consumers and so may be exempted under Art. 101(3): ‘Firstly, 
resale price maintenance may be necessary to induce distributors to promote 
a new product when it is not practical to achieve this result contractually. 
Secondly, resale price maintenance may be necessary to organise short-term 
(six to eight weeks) promotions in distribution agreements belonging to a 
franchise  system  or  similar  distribution  system  applying  a  uniform 
distribution system (arguably, selective distribution systems). Thirdly, the 
parties may demonstrate that resale price maintenance is a means to avoid 
free  riding  of  pre-sale  services,  in  particular,  in  the  case  of  experienced 
resellers or complex products’.16 
Reindl  criticises  the  Commission´s  approach  towards  RPM  and 
demands a distinction between harmful and efficient RPM. Without such a 
distinction and in order to stay faithful to the economic approach, case law 
should  determine  what  constitutes  an  infringement  of  Article  101(1).17 
Kyprianides agrees that RPM may result in some efficiencies, but he supports 
the general presumption of RPM being a hardcore restriction and refers to the 
lack of ‘solid empirical evidence’ as to whether the efficiencies of RPM can 
fully outweigh the disadvantages and harm it sometimes causes.18  
 
c) The future of hardcore restrictions or restrictions by object 
  Jones et al. have found that the Commission and the ECJ have a 
different understanding of restrictions by object.19 The Commission states 
that restrictions by object are those which ‘by their very nature’ are likely to 
produce  negative  effects  on  the  market  and  to  jeopardise  the  objectives 
pursued  by  EU  competition  rules.  Because  of  their  high  potentiality  to 
produce negative effects, there is no need to assess their ‘actual effects on the 
market’.20 However, the ECJ finds that to determine whether conduct is ‘by 
its  very  nature’  injurious  to  competition  or  anti-competitive  by  nature 
(restrictive by object), ‘regard must be given inter alia to the content of its 
provisions, the objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal context 
of which it forms a part’.21 
King supports Jones’ findings and refers to the Louis Erauw22 case 
where the Court found that even absolute territorial protection can fall outside 
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the scope of Art. 101(1).23 In the recent BIDS case, the Court did not apply 
the Commission´s categorisation of object and effect cases, and it states that 
to decide whether an arrangement is an anti-competitive restriction by object, 
the agreement’s  content and the economic context are to be examined.24 
Therefore it is doubtful whether case law reflects the Commission’s policy of 
object and effect cases and in taking this further the existence of object cases 
in the near future may be in question. Bailey acknowledges that in the Pierre 
Fabre case,25 the ECJ for the first time saw an ‘objective justifiability’ for a 
restriction by object.26 Thus, it is no wonder that some authors call the new 
approach to EU competition law a ‘more analytical approach’ rather than 
effects-based.27   
 
 
B. Anti-competitive vertical restraints by effect 
 
Where a vertical agreement does not infringe Art. 101 by object, it is 
necessary to look at the effect of the agreement. Only then will it be possible 
to identify a factual restriction to competition.28  
 
a) Selective distribution/exclusive distribution 
Producers of branded products usually establish a distribution system 
in which the products can be bought and resold only by authorised distributors 
and  retailers  to  members  of  the  system  or  to  the  final  consumer.29  The 
Commission states in its new Guidelines that these distribution systems may 
restrict intra-brand competition, foreclose other competitors’ access to the 
market,  soften  competition  and  facilitate  collusion  between  suppliers  or 
buyers.30 On the other hand, through distribution structures suppliers try to 
create and maintain a particular brand image of their product and ensure that 
the sale of their goods is accompanied by the provision of pre -sale retail 
services.31 
In the Metro I case the ECJ upheld the Commission’s opinion that 
selective distribution accords with Art. 101(1) provided that: (1) resellers are 
chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature relating to the 
technical qualifications of the reseller and its staff and the suitability of its 
trading premises, and that (2) such conditions are laid down uniformly for all 
potential  resellers  and  are  not  applied  in  a  discriminatory  fashion32 
(qualitative selective distribution). Other selective distribution systems may 
infringe Art. 101(1), but they may take advantage of the block exemption in 
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the BER if the market share does not exceed 30 per cent or they may satisfy 
Art. 101(3) on an individual basis.33 
Another distribution agreement which raises anti-competitive concern 
is an exclusive distribution agreement, in which the manufacturer appoints a 
sole distributor for a particular area. Hereby the distributor is sheltered from 
intra-band  competition  and  will  be  encouraged  to  incur  expenditure 
promoting and advertising the product, safe from  other distributors’ free 
riding on that expenditure.34 In the STM case the ECJ held that exclusive 
agreements will not restrict competition if it is necessary to penetrate a new 
market.35 
By the use of exclusive distribution practices the Commission fears 
the  reduction  of  intra -brand  competition  and  facilitation  of  price 
discrimination in different territories as well as softening competition, easing 
collusion or foreclosure of the market to the detriment of other competitors.36 
It states, however, that the loss of intra-brand competition can only be seen as 
problematic if inter-brand competition is limited. This concern is assumed to 
be given only if the supplier has a strong position on the market.37 
Jones and Suffrin state that the requirements set out by the  ECJ are 
difficult to apply in practice, and identical restrictions have been labelled as 
qualitative in some cases and quantitative in others. Selective distribution 
systems have not been adequately assessed to determine whether or not they 
lead to an anti-competitive outcome on the market.38 
Marsden and Whelan want the Commission to permanently consider 
consumers’ desires and values. In particular, the Commission should be aware 
of those products where the pre-sales service is becoming less relevant for 
consumers  and  should  not  be  hesitant  in  taking  action  where  selective 
distribution does not lead to an increase in consumer welfare.39 
With regard to exclusive distributions, Cox writes that allowing intra-
brand competition via a non-exclusive distribution module has been proven 
in legal literature to be both beneficial to manufacturers as well as consumer 
interests. Intra-brand competition provides optimal incentives to the relevant 
competing distributors to work diligently, thus limiting costs and lead time 
while  improving  availability  and  the  promotion  of  products.  Also,  the 
granting of exclusive territories to distributors has been proven to result in 
excessive price distortion being detrimental to consumer interests. This was 
experienced by Apple in the marketing of its first iPhone.40 
 
  b) Rule of reason  
Many authors believe that the ECJ is adopting the United States’ ‘rule 
of reason’ which allows the consideration of enhanced efficiencies achieved 
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by  potentially  anti-competitive  agreements  in  any  case.41  For  instance, 
Callery refers to the  Wouters case42 where the ECJ found that ‘despite the 
effects of restrictive competition that are inherent’ in forbidding lawyers to 
work  with  accountants  laid  down  by  Bar  Association  regulations,  ‘it  is 
necessary for the proper practice of the legal profession’ in the Member State 
concerned.43  In their opinion, the  Wouters case shows that the ECJ also 
considers non-competition factors, i.e. social and political concerns, besides 
any competition factors. This can also be seen in the Meca-Medina case44 
where the ECJ assesses the restriction of competition under Art. 101(1) in the 
case  of anti-doping  rules  and  finally  concludes  that  they  are  not  anti -
competitive  because  of  their  ‘objective  justification’.  Therefore,  Callery 
believes that the ECJ has widened the scope of justifiability by ‘public interest 
justifications’.45    
 
C. Competition law and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
 
The relationship between competition law and IPRs is sometimes not 
easy because IPRs give the innovator a legal monopoly and provide them with 
the  right  to  exclusively  exploit  the  innovation  and  exclude  others  from 
exploiting it. Both IPRs and competition law aim at protecting consumer 
welfare,  the  former  by  promoting  technical  progress  and  the  latter  by 
protecting  competition  as  the  driving  force  behind  efficient  markets, 
providing  best  quality  products  at  the  lowest  price.46  Concentrating on 
vertical  agreements,  IPRs  in  the  framework  of  licences  or  exclusive 
agreements  should  be  discussed.  Although  th e  Commission  says  that 
companies  should  not  be  allowed  to  establish  private barriers between 
Member States,47 the ECJ, especially in IPR cases, questions whether the 
barrier is justified. Besides Consten and Grundig48 this style of ECJ behaviour 
can be seen in different cases.  
 
The Nungesser judgement shows some sensitivity to the commercial 
and economic context of licensing agreements. Thereafter, open exclusivity, 
whereby  the  licensor  agrees  not  to  grant  licence  to  anyone  else  in  the 
licensee´s  territory,  does  not  necessarily  infringe  Art.  101(1)  since  the 
licensee accepts the risk of marketing a new product.49 
With reference to the case law, Wish and Bailey conclude that in the 
situation of IPRs a more nuanced approach is required, so even absolute 
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territorial  protection  and  export  bans  may  not  infringe  Art.  101(1)  in 
particular circumstances.50   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The discussions above clearly demonstrate the following findings: 
Firstly, the Commission and the ECJ do not fully agree on the approach EU 
competition  law  should  have.  In  the  ECJ´s  arguments  and  judgements, 
hardcore restrictions do not occupy the role that the Commission represents 
in its new Guidelines - the Court applies its ‘analytical approach’ in any anti-
competitive case. Secondly, most anti-competitive agreements fall outside 
Art. 101(1) because block exemptions ‘presume’, not prove by evidence, that 
companies  with  a market  share below 30 per  cent  are unlikely to  affect 
competition on the European market and that their distribution policy allows 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits.51 The minority with a market 
share above 30 per cent may escape infringement of Art. 101(1) either by 
‘objective justification’, which must not be economic as the ECJ confirms in 
its cases, or may convince the ECJ that their anti-competitive behaviour is 
essential for product marketing, prevents free rides or is necessary for the 
exhaustion of their IPRs, etc. 
Nevertheless, there are scholars who welcome the Commission’s new 
Guidelines and the BER.52 It is, in fact, very reasonable and effective when, 
through  the  BER  under  Art.  3(1),  ‘both’  buyers’  and  suppliers’  anti-
competitive practices are not to be exempted if the 30 per cent market share 
threshold is exceeded. But if the ECJ does not follow the Commission’s views 
within its Guidelines in the future, which has occasionally occurred in the 
past, the effectiveness of the Guidelines and the Regulations would seriously 
be in doubt. Reciprocally, should the ECJ’s ‘analytical approach’ sit within 
the Commission’s 2010 new Guidelines, its 2004 Guidelines on Art. 81(3) 
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